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Abstract
For nearly 30 years, fake digital documents have been used to identify external intruders and malicious insider
threats. Unfortunately, while fake files hold potential to assist in data theft detection, there is little evidence of
their application outside of niche organisations and academic institutions. The barrier to wider adoption appears
to be the difficulty in constructing deceptive content. The current generation of solutions principally: (1) use
unrealistic random data; (2) output heavily formatted or specialised content, that is difficult to apply to other
environments; (3) require users to manually build the content, which is not scalable, or (4) employ an existing
production file, which creates a protection paradox. This paper introduces a set of requirements for generating
automated fake file content: (1) enticing, (2) realistic, (3) minimise disruption, (4) adaptive, (5) scalable
protective coverage, (6) minimise sensitive artefacts and copyright infringement, and (7) contain no
distinguishable characteristics. These requirements have been drawn from literature on natural science, magical
performances, human deceit, military operations, intrusion detection and previous fake file solutions. These
requirements guide the design of an automated fake file content construction system, providing an opportunity for
the next generation of solutions to find greater commercial application and widespread adoption.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Fake files, also referred to as honeytokens (Spitzner, 2003), honeyfiles (Yuill et al., 2004), digital decoys
(Kushner, 2003), decoy files (Bowen et al., 2009), and canary files (Whitham, 2013a), is a cyber deception
approach that holds potential to assist in data theft detection. There has been work on fake file processes and
systems, however, research in the production of deceptive content has been limited to specific circumstances and
problems, such as database fields (White and Thompson, 2006; Bercovitch et al., 2011), passwords and account
details (Bojinov et al., 2010; Nikiforakis et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012) and file attributes (Rowe 2004; Yuill et al.,
2004; Bowen et al. 2009; Ben-Salem and Stolfo, 2011; Voris et al., 2012). In most cases the researcher hand
crafted the deceptive content or reduced the problem to a set of defined fields. Several researchers have
commented that automating deceptive content is either impossible, or much harder than it first appears, and
migrating these handcrafted solutions to new content types or environments is likely to require significant effort
(Rowe, 2004, White and Thompson, 2006).
The problem of automated content generation is very much in its infancy. In the military, deception is a long
established art form; specialist staff appointments are supported with thousands of years of advice on how to
build and run deceptive campaigns. In the field of cyber security, conversely, fake file researchers and
practitioners cannot be confident in designing solutions without guidance on what constitutes success. This paper
briefly reviews the area of fake files for deception and then presents seven requirements that fake file content
generation techniques must address to be successful.

FAKE FILES
Clifford Stoll (2005) was the first to publish a description on the use of deception in the defence of computer
networks. In August 1986, a persistent computer intruder attacked the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL).
Instead of trying to keep the intruder out, Stoll took the novel approach of allowing the intruder to access the
system, baiting them with fake files to successfully capture the attacker’s activities and trace the source.
There are a number of advantages of employing fake files. One of the key challenges to traditional approaches is
the necessity to collect and track every action on the network. The massive amount of security data generated by
network sensors and host-based applications can quickly overwhelm the operators charged with defending the
network (Conti, 2006). By monitoring only fake files, intrusion detection teams can reduce the number of
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documents that need to be observed, a similar approach to ‘focused monitoring’ (Roesch et al., 1999). When
positioned and configured correctly, fake files can generate a very small number of high interest alerts (BenSalem and Stolfo, 2011). Unlike honeypots, fake files do not require additional hardware, or expose further
potential software vulnerabilities. Fake files can be placed directly in file repositories, amongst the documents
that need protection (Voris et al., 2013), rather than installed on a different IP address, collision domain, or
network segment.
Fake files, like other forms of deception, can also create confusion and uncertainty regarding the value and
location of critical information systems and resources (Tirenin and Faatz, 1999). The intruder’s lack of
knowledge of the file system makes it difficult to discern what truly belongs (White and Thompson, 2006). In
most instances, if the attacker desires to read the contents of the fake document, their only option is to open the
file and risk triggering an alarm (Yuill et al., 2004). This dilemma presents a combinatorial problem of
differentiating the false from the real (Jackson and Hart, 2004), creating a deterrent and making the attackers
cautious and uncertain.

FAKE FILE CONTENT GENERATION
While the placement and ability to track the fake file are important system design considerations (Bowen et al.
2009; Ben-Salem and Stolfo, 2011), the success of the fake file is largely due to the construct of its deceptive
content (filename, file attributes and the actual document text). One of the challenges that Stoll faced was that
the intruder’s brief modem connections prevented telephone technicians from resolving the geographic location
of the source more precisely than to a particular German city. Stoll baited the intruder by generating realistic and
attractive content about how LBL was to support research on the controversial US military Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). The files also contained a mailing list and a request form to obtain additional documents by
mail. Not only did the intruder find the documents, they also remained logged into the terminal for several hours
reading the text, allowing a successful trace. The content in the deception was so successful that the intruder also
lodged the application form requesting the additional documents (Stoll, 2000).

Figure 1: The Linden-Hype Cycle of Capability Maturity
Despite Stoll’s success in the 1980s and the acclaimed potential of fake files to detect data theft, there has been
little research in the area of deceptive content generation. Comparatively, the concepts of usage control,
encryption and content tagging (watermarking), have evolved to commercial products that can allow a relatively
non-technical user to specify complex rules to protect a variety of content in a range of environments. Gartner
employs the Linden-Hype Cycle (Linden and Fenn, 2003), shown in figure 1, to differentiate the maturity of a
product or capability. The early introductory phase of a solution is characterised by: (1) little to no adoption in
the marketplace; and (2) the performance of products is poor outside of customised deployments. This
description aligns with the current state of fake file systems. Only a single fake file solution is available on the
Internet (Carey, 2013). Even this sole solution requires the user to supply the entire fake content; the system just
manages distribution and detection. To date there are no public commercial fake file offerings.
The key barrier to fake files delivering on their expectations appears to be the burden of generating deceptive
content. White and Thompson (White and Thompson, 2006) noted, “It takes a lot of effort to produce realistic
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decoys... It took several months of research to locate all of the data that was needed to produce each field. This
information also had to be processed into a usable form in order to incorporate it into the program. This is a very
labour intensive task”. Even a recent solution proposed by Wang, et al. (2014) requires a new software module
to be developed for each topic.

REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT
One of the first steps in designing a system to automate fake file content is to develop requirements.
Requirements are a set of aspirational behaviours of the system (Sommerville and Kotonya, 1998). They inform
the design of the solution and are essential components of both sequential design processes, such as the waterfall
methodology (Benington, 1987; Bell and Thayer, 1976) and agile design, like Scrum (Schwaber, 1997).
Requirements can be detailed, like software requirements specifications documents (Jackson 1995), or a list of
guiding principles, such as the U.S. military’s idioms for military deception: (1) focus, (2) objective, (3)
centralised planning and control, (4) security, (5) timeliness, and (6) integration (United States Government,
2012). While ideas can be drawn from related areas, it is rarely possible, however, to enforce a complete set of
requirements designed for one task to a related, but different problem (Nuseibeh and Easterbrook, 2000).
The remainder of the paper presents a set of seven requirements drawn from a review of deceptive literature in
the fields of natural science, magical performance, human deceit and military operations. Much of the work on
cyber deception has been drawn from developments in these fields. These fake file content generation
requirements also build on recent work from other researchers who have considered the problem of delivering
cyber deception from a system perspective.

REQUIREMENTS TO GOVERN THE GENERATION OF FAKE FILE CONTENT
Enticing
There are many examples of plants and animals successfully employing mimicry to entice and entrap prey.
Figure 2 is a picture of the Venus Fly Trap, a carnivorous plant that emits a deceptive scent to attract its insect
prey. The Anglerfish is another example. It has a fleshy outgrowth protruding from the fish’s head, which acts as
a fisherman’s rod and lure.

Figure 2: The Venus Fly Trap emits an enticing scent to attract its insect prey
Enticement is also an effective military strategy. The Battle of Kasserine Pass took place during the Tunisia
Campaign of World War II in February 1943. During the initial engagements, the U.S. forces were tricked into
believing that the enemy was retreating. The German tank retirement was a ploy. When the German panzers
reached the ambush point, with U.S. armour in hot pursuit, a screen of German anti-tank guns engaged,
destroying nearly all the American tanks deployed to Tunisia. Without armoured support, the U.S. infantry were
compelled to withdraw, and most of Tunisia fell into German hands (Watson 2006).
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Constructing content that is desirable to data thieves is critical to the utility of a fake file (Salem and Stolfo,
2011). One of the limitations of fake files is that they can only detect data theft if a fake file is accessed by the
perpetrator (Joshi and Sardana, 2011). Enticing a malicious user by advertising a list of passwords is likely to be
more effective than mimicking a document containing the office social calendar.
The military approach to enticement is to devise a scenario in which the target is inclined to take action (Daniel
and Herbig, 1982). In the context of fake files, this might involve matching the fake content to the desires of the
attacker (Yuill et al., 2004; Bowen et al., 2009). However, this can be a difficult approach to achieve in practice;
what is important for one threat actor, may not be important for another. For instance, an external data thief
might seek immediately exploitable financial data, whereas a disgruntled insider might desire intellectual
property.
A simpler approach, less dependent on the attacker, might concentrate on matching the fake file content with the
sensitive data that requires protection. Sensitive data could be identified as part of an organisational threat and
risk assessment to discover and appraise potential disruptions to the operation of the business. Identification of
sensitive data might also be achieved dynamically through automated detection algorithms, such as those
proposed by White and Panda (2011).
Realistic
Realism is critically important for deception (Haswell, 1985; Dewar, 1989; Latimer, 2003). During World War
II, the Allies successfully delayed the reinforcement of German military forces at Normandy, through the use of
physical dummies (see figure 2), logistical movements and simulated radio traffic (Perroni, 1984). The Allied
forces organised a small team of people to simulate an entire radio network of military units. Great care was
taken in ensuring authenticity including, the scripting of mistakes, confusions, unnecessary replications and
transmission conflicts to ensure realism (Young and Stamp, 1990).

Figure 3: A realistic, inflatable tank (taken by an unknown photographer)
In 2000, a RAND study (Gerwehr and Rothenberg, 2000) conducted an experiment to test the effectiveness of
deception against cyber adversaries. They concluded that realistic deceptions are more effective. That same year,
Cohen (2000) independently argued that as a counterintelligence tool, deceptions could be of significant value,
particularly if the artificial constructions were made to sufficient authenticity. His follow on study concluded
that while simple deceptions are very effective at what they do, content must also be provided that survives
scrutiny (Cohen and Thomas, 2001). Bowen, et al. (2009) used the term ‘believability’. Voris, et al (2011),
expanded on Bowen’s idea, stating that, “upon inspection, a [fake document] should appear authentic and
trustworthy. In the absence of any additional information, it should be impossible to discern a spurious decoy
from authentic data” (Voris, et al., 2011, p6)
It takes significant effort to produce realistic deceptive content, even for highly formatted data (White and
Thompson, 2006). Creating coherent sentences is even more challenging. The next generation of fake file
content generation systems may need to conform with phonetic, morphological, lexical, syntactic, semantic and
discourse conventions (Liddy, 1998; Feldman, 1999). They may need to appreciate Natural Language Processing
factors, such as: author styles, sentence complexity, paragraph lengths, layout and mimicking embedded
artefacts (Goldstein et al., 1999; Callaway and Lester, 2002). Realistic constructions may need to be aware of
preventing repetitive prose, managing distance since the previous use against harvested statistical distributions
(Elhadad and Robin, 1992; Stede, 1996). These systems may also need to ensure that the synthetic content is no
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more or less legible than those documents that it is trying to protect, include grammatical peculiarities and
spelling mistakes.
Minimise Disruption
Yuill, Zappe, Denning, and Feer (2004) proposed that fake files increase a network’s internal security without
adversely affecting normal operations. This is not necessarily true in all circumstances. For instance, realistic
and enticing fake documents can pollute authentic data, confusing legitimate users or wasting their time (White
and Thompson, 2006; Bowen et al., 2009). The insertion of fake data could skew the statistical properties of the
data management system (White and Thompson, 2006). This bias can be very significant in certain applications
(Adam and Worthmann, 1989).
Balancing the requirement to minimise the disruption to authentic users against other characteristics, such as
believability, is one of the most critical aspects of any practical fake file system (Bowen et al., 2009).
Thankfully, legitimate users should be very familiar with the content in the folders that they regularly access and
will also utilise their system in fairly predictable ways (Bowen et al., 2009). Masqueraders, or automated
processes running as the identity of a legitimate user, will have a limited knowledge of the file system, and may
be more likely to conduct general content searches. These approaches need to be balanced against the
requirements to entice malicious users, by employing indexable plain text content in the language used
predominantly in the file system, and the desire to reduce distinguishable characteristics (discussed later).
Adaptive
Tirenin and Faatz (1999) argued that effective cyber deceptions must be dynamic in their implementation,
presenting a continually changing situational picture to the enemy. In nature, deceptive adaptability provides
distinct advantages to the user. For instance, figure 4 provides three time-sequenced pictures of the Octopus
Vulgaris reacting to a potential predator by altering its colour, opacity, and reflectivity of the epidermis to blend
in the background (Hanlon, 2007). Adaptability is also a critical component of a successful military deception,
providing the flexibility to deal with unforeseen developments, and adjusting to a dynamic environment
(Haswell, 1985; Latimer, 2003; Dickerson, 2003).

Figure 4: Octopus vulgaris reacting to a diver / predator (Hanlon, 2007)
Bowen, et al. (2009) included ‘variability’ in their set of system properties for decoy documents. They use the
term to promote randomness in the initial generation in order to avoid detection. In 2004, Rowe (2004) published
a prototype fake file generator (NFDir) that was able to construct fake files using the statistical averages of the
target file system. Similarly, Kontaxis, Polychronakis and Keromytis (2014) developed a software prototype that
produces fake network activity in response to a set of simple, single-keyword dictionary queries. The fake traffic
generation process is conducted prior to the system becoming operational, as the training activity is
computationally expensive. Variability, however, is not the same as adaptability. The limitation on both these
approaches is that this process appears only to add variability on creation. Adaptability necessitates a continual
feedback process to modify one or more aspects of the fake file during the term of its life, and to determine when
the fake file is no longer necessary.
Yuill et al. (2004) presented a system to support the creation and management of fake files. They noted that
operational systems change over time, and so too must fake files if they are to be believable. They proposed that
the files’ time attributes of the deceptive documents must be updated to maintain consistency with the file
system. It is not just file names and time attributes that should be dynamic. Production file repositories routinely
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add, modify and delete documents and organisations can change their foci. Maintaining realism requires other
elements of fake file content to also keep pace with the changes occurring in the file system.
Scalable Protective Coverage
Coverage is a term used to quantify the field of view of a sensor or system of sensors (Dhillon and Chakrabarty,
2003). Lack of coverage, or ‘scale insensitivity’, is an intrusion detection systems design problem, limiting the
cyber sensor’s effectiveness to envelop a target environment (Mann, 1984; Roesch et al., 1999; Bass, 2000).
Honeypots often face scalability and coverage challenges due to their fixed position within the network
(Spitzner, 2003). In fake file systems, coverage may vary depending on the algorithm or processes used to
generate the content, or the access method employed by the data thief. For instance, a fake file may not cover a
user manually reviewing a specific directory, but provide suitable coverage against content searching. This paper
defines these coverage constraints as horizontal (the inability to support a broad range of document content) and
vertical (the inability to cover the volume of targets). These types are illustrated in figure 5.

Figure 5: Vertical and horizontal scaling insensitivity
Horizontal scale insensitivity can manifest in a reduced set of support for languages, formatting styles and
embedded artefacts, and inability to manage colloquialisms, abbreviations, misspellings, and new lexicography.
For instance, the current generation of fake file systems largely built content based on fixed formats or templates
(Stribling et al., 2005; White and Thompson, 2006; Bowen et al., 2009; Bojinov et al., 2010), which are likely to
require significant investment in development resources to migrate.
Vertical scaling is also a highly desirable attribute. It is important for a fake file to protect the intended targets
(Spafford and Zamboni, 2000). Typically, this means generating a fake file content that mimics one or more
sensitive documents (Whitham, 2013b). Ideally, a fake file system should be able to produce as small a number
of fake files as possible to cover the targets. Coverage of a single document is not ideal, as system owners can
employ potentially simpler options, such as file watermarking. Conversely, deploying a large number of fake
files across the environment is likely to result in a higher incidence of accidental false alarms and user
disruption. The intended coverage area could unintentionally expand beyond the intended targets, covering
documents with similar content, terminology, authorship style and audience (Manber et al., 1994; Heintze et al.,
1996).
Minimise Sensitive Artefacts and Copyright Infringement
Voris, Boggs and Stolfo (2012) proposed a method of translating existing documents into a language not present
on the file system. Their research showed great promise to address one of the weaknesses of fake documents,
where false positives are generated due to accidental accesses by benign users, and improve the level of realism
and association with the protected material. There are some limitations with the translation method. Firstly, these
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fake file constructs are likely to contain sensitive artefacts from the documents that the system is attempting to
protect, creating a protection paradox. Secondly, care should also be taken for the module implementation not to
contradict national and international laws (Cenys et al., 2005). For instance, the proposal from Kushner (2003) to
rebrand previously released films as new release titles in order to trap criminals downloading movies, may
violate the copyright provisions associated with the decoy film. Care should be taken when drawing on content,
such as names, numbers, discoveries, decisions and images within an organisation’s file system to ensure that its
whole or partial use does not violate privacy legislation or confidentially agreements.
Several experiments in the field of natural science have found that the relationship between realism and the
effectiveness of the mimic is nonlinear, providing diminishing returns for added realism (Dittrich et al., 1993;
Goodale and Sneddon, 1977). Moreover, mimics that seem imperfect to humans may actually appear as good
mimics to other species (Dittrich et al., 1993; Cuthill and Bennett, 1993). White and Thompson (2006) also
observed that one of the properties of good decoys was that they are realistic, at least at a distance. Bowen, et al.
(2009) believed that in the case of fake documents, it is imperative that these files have realistic file names and
modification dates lest even casual observation reveal their phony nature. In comparison, the believability of
document text is of a lower priority. This is because an attacker would have already triggered an alert when
opening the document by the time they analyse the content.
Threat actors frequently employ search tools to find content or particular types of files, and often this process is
automated (Yuill et al., 2004). Bowen, et al. (2009) considered measuring frequently occurring search terms
associated with major categories of interest (e.g., words or terms drawn from finance, medical information,
intellectual property) and use these as the constituent words in fake documents. It may be possible to present the
fake file as a genuine target to automated content based indexing technologies. Matching search ranking results
with target content could deliver a suitable level of content ‘enticingness’, while avoiding the problems of direct
extraction of complete sentences from the target documents. While an illegible document may be recognised by
humans, the indexable text may perform adequately against these automated processes or causal human
searches.
No Distinguishable Characteristics
Generation of fake files with uniquely identifiable characteristics can allow an attacker to develop detection
capabilities to counter the deception. Producing convincing fake files requires careful planning because humans
can recognise deceptive patterns (Rowe, 2005). This ability improves through continual exposure to deception
(Mitchell and Thompson, 1986). The composition of synthetic text content should contain sufficient variability
to avoid simple statistical analysis (Rowe, et al., 2004) and algorithms that can detect generated texts (Lavergne
et al., 2008). Most importantly, the task of identifying a fake file should not be reducible to identifying a
particular invariant that exists in all generated fake files, which can be used to develop a signature (Bowen et al.,
2009). A single search or test function would thus easily distinguish the real from the fake, such as documents
written in unusual languages, uncharacteristic formats or text that comprise random words, rather than structured
sentences (Voris et al., 2012).
Honeypots face similar challenges. Network intruders can search for parameter values for the hardware devices,
kernel or virtual system configuration settings and memory values (Holz and Raynal, 2005; Detristan et al.,
2003). Anomaly-based detection can also be employed against deception systems, comparing the metrics of fake
devices and data against those of typical computer systems (Rowe, 2006), inspecting randomly-chosen files or
directories to see if they look ‘normal’ (Fu et al., 2006), checking content against other nearby material to
determine if it is out of place (Lavoie and Krishnamoorthy, 2010), or employing timing tests (Zou and
Cunningham, 2006). Rowe (2005) also highlighted that if an attacker is able to find material in the local drive
that is nearly identical to what is written in a document, he or she may be able to conclude that the document in
question was generated using content harvesting techniques. As previously discussed, the next generation of fake
file content generation systems may need to appreciate factors such as: author styles and linguistic structures,
sentence complexity, paragraph lengths, layout, numbers of embedded artefacts found in the texts they are
attempting to mimic. These systems may also need to ensure that the synthetic content is no more or less legible
than those documents that it is trying to protect, include grammatical peculiarities and spelling mistakes.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Successfully detecting data breaches and the loss of electronic records remains a serious challenge. Deception
approaches, namely the employment of fake files, has demonstrated value in generating uncertainty in the
environment, and when positioned and configured correctly, can generate a very small number of high interest
alerts. Even greater value may be obtained when paired with traditional security technologies.

26

The greatest barrier to producing a commercial fake file solution appears to be the ability to reliably and
efficiently scale to mimic a range of data content. Several attempts to automate this process have been tried,
largely through the application of fixed templates and/or handcrafted rules, which introduce complexity in
management and prevent their portability.
This paper introduces a set of requirements for fake file content generation: (1) enticing, (2) realism, (3)
minimise disruption, (4) adaptive, (5) scalable protective coverage, (6) minimise sensitive artefacts and
copyright infringement, and (7) no distinguishable characteristics. The requirements have been developed from
literature on natural science, magical performances, human deceit, military operations, intrusion detection and
previous fake file constructions. These requirements will help aid research into deception effectiveness, and
deception counter-measure investigations. In practice, formal requirements allow the development of systems
that can be deployed to provide deception-based protection to real systems efficiently and effectively
The next stage of the research is to develop a set of quantifiable metrics, based on these seven requirements, to
aid the comparison between different methods. This research will continue through the application of natural
language processing to the problem of fake file content automation.
Future research could involve ranking the requirements by importance, mapped against desired outcomes, such
as file system watermarking, deterrence or influencing an intruder or insider to perform a specific activity. There
is also a clear gap in the automation of deceptive content.
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